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Introduction
During the 1980s,  the Soviet Union was the world's top importer of grain,  with annual
imports averaging 36 million tons.  Since the economic reforms that began in the Newly
Independent  States  (NIS) of the former USSR in 1992 have intended to transform the
economies from centrally planned to market-oriented  systems, they could substantially
change the countries'  production, consumption,  and trade of agricultural  goods, with
consequences for world agricultural markets.  In the early 1990s, a number of Western
studies attempted to forecast these changes.2
This  paper  has  two  purposes.  The  first  is  to  compare  these  studies'  commodity
forecasts, as well as assumptions about reform,  with the actual changes to date  in  NIS
agriculture,  given  that  about  5  years  have  elapsed since  the  NIS  countries  began
serious  reform.  The  second  is  to  present  our  forecasts  as  to  how  agricultural
production,  consumption,  and trade  in the NIS region  could change from the present
time to 2005.
Given the difficulty in the early 1990s of predicting what specific reform  program  the
USSR (or its successor states) would adopt, the objective of these earlier studies was
not necessarily to forecast what would actually happen to the commodity  structure of
NIS  agriculture 5 to 10 years after ,,reform" began.  Rather, the purpose was to forecast
changes based on  the general  premise  (fleshed  out with  specific assumptions)  that
fairly ambitious reform  was  pursued. We examine these studies  less to  evaluate the
accuracy  or  quality  of  their  specific  predictions,  and  more  so  to  compare  the
assumptions  they  make about the  nature  and effects of reform  with  the  NIS'  actual
reform  experience.  This  helps  us  to  formulate  our  own  reform  assumptions  for
forecasting from the present to 2005.
The most  important  prediction of these earlier studies is that major market-oriented
1 The  authors  are economists with the Market  and Trade  Economics Division of the  Economic
Research  Service,  U.S.  Dept. of Agriculture.  They wish to thank  Darina  Batkova,  Christian  Foster,
Mark Giordano,  Kim  Hjort,  Roger  Hoskin,  Olga  Liefert, Yuri  Markish,  Jay  Mitchell,  Sharon  Sheffield
and John Wainio for their help in various stages of this project, as  well as Stephen  Haley and
Lloyd Teigen  for their careful  reviews.  The opinions expressed  in this paper are the authors'  alone
and do  not in any  way represent official USDA  views or policies.
2 See  Liefert,  Koopman,  and  Cook  (1993),  Koopman  (1991),  and  Tyers (1994).  Though they do
not use  forecasting  models in their analysis,  Johnson (1993)  and  Tangermann  (1993)  make  some
general  predictions  as to how  reform  could  affect  NIS  agriculture.  Although  Liefert  et al.  was
published  in  1993,  it was  written  in  1991.
210reform would not only end large grain  imports,  but also transform the  NIS region  into a
big net exporter of grain.  Two of the studies forecast post-reform  net grain exports for
the region  in excess  of 30  million tons.  One reason for the  exports,  concerning  the
demand  side of the  NIS  grain economy,  is that reform  would  contract  the  livestock
sector,  mainly  because  its  relatively  high  production  and  transaction  costs  make  it
uncompetitive  vis-a-vis the world market.  The sector's  downsizing  would  lower  NIS
demand  for feed  grain,  freeing  output for  export.  On  the  supply  side,  the  studies
assumed  that  reform  would  raise  productivity,  and thereby  output,  within  the  grain
economy.
Although  the  reform  changes  to  date  have  in  fact  substantially  reduced  NIS  grain
imports,  they have not yet turned the region  into  a grain  exporter.  In 1996,  the  NIS
region  was  a modest net  importer  of grain  (3-4  million tons).  The studies  correctly
predict a drop in livestock production,  and therefore a decline  in  NIS demand for feed
grain  (livestock  production  and  herds  have  actually  fallen  more  than  the  studies
projected).  However,  grain output  in the region  has decreased  substantially.  In both
1995 and 1996,  total NIS  grain production (cleanweight) was  about 120  million tons,
only two-thirds  of Soviet average  annual  output during  1987-1991.  Production  has
dropped mainly because yields have decreased,  rather than  increased as the studies
assumed.  Yields  have  declined  largely  because  reform  has  severely  worsened
agricultural producers'  terms of trade (a development not anticipated  by these studies),
thereby reducing input use.
The main assumptions behind our forecasts concern growth  of real  GDP  (which affects
consumer income and thereby demand)  and agricultural productivity.  In both cases we
assume modest growth.  We assume  productivity growth will  not be high  because  of
poor prospects for the institutional  reform of NIS  agriculture, specifically  involving  land
markets and ownership rights,  necessary to improve  incentives to use resources  more
productively.
We  predict  that  by 2005  NIS  net  grain  imports  will fall  almost to  zero,  and  that  the
region could become  a  small net exporter of coarse grains (though  not  of corn).  We
also forecast that NIS imports of meat, which from  1991  to 1996 rose from  about 1 to
over 2  million tons, will remain  high,  at somewhat  less than 2  million  tons. The  main
changes  in NIS agricultural trade since reform will therefore  not be reversed.  Rather
than importing  large amounts of feed grain to maintain  artificially high levels of livestock
production,  the  region  will  directly  import  meat,  reflecting  its  apparent  comparative
disadvantage  in  meat production.
The NIS region as referred to in our study includes all 15 countries of the former USSR.
The forecasts  presented for both  our and others' work are  for the  NIS  region  in the
aggregate, with trade values measuring the region's net imports or exports vis-a-vis all
countries outside the region.  Also, we limit our study to forecasts for grain and meat.
Previous Studies of the Effect of NIS Reform  on the Region's Agriculture
The  starting  point for  research  concerning  the effect of economic  reform  and  trade
liberalization  on  NIS  commodity  production  and  trade  was  the calculation  by  Cook,
Liefert,  and Koopman  (1991)  of producer subsidy equivalents  (PSEs) and consumer
211subsidy equivalents (CSEs)  for Soviet agricultural  products  in  1986  (table  1).3  The
main findings of Cook et al. are that for most commodities,  both agricultural  producers
and consumers were highly subsidized.
Although the previous studies  examined  in this paper differ  in  terms  of their specific
assumptions about reform  and its effects,  they share the key general assumptions that
reform  (1) reduces (or totally eliminates)  subsidies and taxes to agricultural  producers
and consumers (as measured by PSEs and CSEs); and (2) results in greater integration
into the world economy, which means that world prices become  the main determinant
of domestic prices.
Liefert,  Koopman  and Cook (1993)  uses the PSE  and CSE calculations  from  Cook et
al.  as the basis for forecasting  how economic  reform  and  trade  liberalization  in  the
former Union would change agricultural production,  consumption, and trade for specific
commodities.  The study employs a  model constructed from  SWOPSIM (Roningen  et
al. (1991)),  a spreadsheet-based  modeling framework used to create a static, global,
net trade model for agriculture.  The model is partial equilibrium, with constant elasticity
supply and demand  curves for each  country (36)  and  commodity  (22  per  country).
Table 2 gives the assumptions of the reform/liberalization scenario.  The main ones are
the elimination of all subsidies and taxes to agricultural producers and consumers (as
measured by PSEs and CSEs), free trade such that world prices completely determine
domestic prices, productivity  improvements  in the crop and  livestock sectors,  but  no
change in consumer income.
Liefert et al.  assumes that the effects of liberalization on production,  consumption,  and
trade should play themselves out within about 5 years.  Table 3 presents the forecasts.
The  NIS countries become a major exporter of wheat (compared  to large  imports before
reform),  though  large  imports  of  corn  continue.  Reform/liberalization  substantially
increases  meat  imports  (3.6  million  tons  compared  to  0.9  million  in  the  base  year
(1986)).
Koopman  (1991)  updates the PSE and CSE estimates to 1989 (table 1), and refines the
net trade projections of Liefert et al.  (again  using a  SWOPSIM  model).  He  presents
results for 3  reform  scenarios, based  on different assumptions  about the nature  and
degree of reform.  The results given in table 4 are from his reform  scenario that appears
to  come closest to the  actual  reform  experience  of the  NIS  countries  to  date.  This
scenario  assumes that  consumer  subsidies  are  eliminated,  producer subsidies  (as
measured by PSEs)  continue, no productivity gains occur in agriculture, and consumer
real incomes decline 20 percent.  The reform adjustment period  is again assumed to be
about 5 years.
Koopman's main result is that the NIS region switches from  being a large grain importer
3 A PSE for a good is the difference  between  domestic producers' incentive price and its world trade (or
border) price (using an economically meaningful exchange rate for conversion).  A commodity's
incentive price equals the domestic producer price plus per unit subsidies in the form of government
policy transfers.  A CSE for a good is the difference between the good's trade price and domestic
consumers' incentive  price,  where the latter equals the price consumers pay  minus any per unit policy
transfer subsidies.  Positive PSEs/CSEs indicate support to  producers/consumers, while  negative values
indicate taxation.
212to a large exporter.  Net exports of wheat balloon to over 30 million tons, while exports
of coarse grains other than corn  reach  17  million tons.  Imports  of corn  remain  fairly
stable at 16 million tons, while meat imports rise to  1.1  million tons.
Tyers  (1994)  utilizes  previous  work  by Koopman,  Liefert  and  Cook to  examine  the
effects of reform/liberalization  on agriculture by the year 2000, using a dynamic, partial
equilibrium  model  of world agriculture.  Tyers assumes  that all  support and taxes to
agricultural  producers and consumers  is eliminated (as measured  by the  PSE and CSE
estimates  in Koopman,  updated to 1990).  He also assumes reform-induced  increases
in consumer income and agricultural productivity (as measured  by crop yields and feed
conversion;  see table 2).  He presents forecasts based on both a high and  low reform
scenario;  since the low reform scenario seems to correspond more closely to the actual
reform  experience,  results from  that scenario are reported.
Like Koopman, Tyers  also forecasts that a reformed  NIS region would become a major
grain exporter, with net exports of wheat equaling 27 million tons by 2000, and of coarse
grains (including corn)  14 million tons (table 5).  Meat  imports are projected  to fall  to a
slight 73,000 tons.
About  5  years  have  elapsed  since  the  NIS  countries  began  to  reform  (to  varying
degrees), the same general period of time that Liefert et al.  and Koopman  allot in  order
for'the  effects  of  reform  to  play  themselves out.  It would  therefore  be  revealing  to
compare not only the commodity forecasts of the 3 studies, but also the assumptions
underpinning the predictions, with the agricultural performance  and reform experience
of the NIS  countries to date.4  However,  comparing these studies'  forecasts  with the
current situation is not a straightforward  exercise, given that each of the studies has a
different base year and projection end-year (Tyers presents  results for 2000).  Also, the
studies  were  based  on  specific assumptions  about  reform,  many  of  which  either
explicitly or implicitly involve a more ambitious reform program than the majority of NIS
countries have adopted to date.  Table 6 presents the 1996 figures for meat and grain
production,  consumption,  and trade in the NIS  region, for use  in the comparisons.
The actual declines in production and consumption of both  grains and meat  have been
much greater than  Liefert et al.  and Tyers predicted  (Koopman  gives results only for
trade,  not  for  production  and  consumption).  Tyers'  projected  end-period  grain
production of 231  million tons is  nearly twice the actual total NIS grain output in  1996
(119  million  tons).  The  studies  are  generally  more  optimistic (or  less  pessimistic),
relative to developments to date, for production than consumption.  This is indicated  by
the fact that the studies generally overestimate the improvement in  the agricultural trade
balance of the NIS  region  (in  all three studies trade  is determined  as the difference
between domestic consumption and production).s  This is particularly true for grain: in
1996 the NIS region  imported 3-4 million tons, while Koopman  and Tyers forecast net
grain exports of over 30 and 40 million tons, respectively.  Concerning trade in meat,
Koopman  forecasts  imports  of  1.1  million  tons,  and  Tyers  imports  of 73,000 tons,
4  Sedik  et  al.  (1996) analyzes  agricultural reform  and  performance  in  Russia  from  1992-1995.
The terms overestimate and  underestimate are  used  in  this context to  mean that  a forecast  was
either too  high  or too low  compared  to  the historical  record  in  1996.
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million tons of meat  imports  is the only prediction  of a  trade balance  for total  meat or
grain worse than the actual record.
Certain  of  the  studies'  assumptions  about  NIS  reform  correspond  well  to  actual
experience to date.  Subsidies to consumers  have been generally ended, subsidies  to
producers  substantially reduced,  and trade controls in most  countries are not strong.
However, the main reason these studies' forecasts contrast so much with the current
record  is that  some of their assumptions differ significantly from  actual  experience  to
date.  To begin with,  productivity performance for both crops and  livestock to date has
been  much  worse  than  the  studies  assumed.  Although  Koopman  assumes  no
productivity increases, Liefert et al.  assumes that grain yields  rise by 10  percent over
the projection period,  and productivity in the livestock sector by 20-25 percent.  For the
Russian part of his model,  Tyers assumes  increases in  grain  yields of 8  percent, and
for  ruminant  and  nonruminant  meat,  2  and  6  percent,  respectively.  In  actuality,
productivity has worsened  since reform.  For example, in  Russia from  1991  to 1995, the
grain/meat conversion rates for beef, pork, and poultry have dropped by  16,  35, and  17
percent,  respectively, while grain yields have fallen about 17 percent compared  to the
immediate  pre-reform years (1987-1991).
The reasons why the studies' productivity assumptions exceed  actual  performance  is
discussed at greater length in the next section.  However, one reason is that the studies
do not account for the severe worsening of agriculture's terms of trade following  price
liberalization.  From  1990 to 1996, agricultural  input prices in Russia rose about 5 times
as  much  as  output  prices.  The  deterioration  of  producers'  terms  of  trade  has
substantially  reduced  farms'  input  purchases  and  use.  For  example,  since  1990,
mineral fertilizer use  in Russia has fallen by about 70 percent.  The decline  in use of
material  inputs has decreased both  yields and  production.  PSE's capture  subsidies
from  government  policy transfers  and  the  gap  between  domestic  and  international
prices.  The PSEs computed for Soviet agriculture therefore failed to capture the implicit
subsidies to producers that  resulted from  a  state-set pricing  system where  prices for
agricultural inputs were fixed much lower (relative to the real costs of production) than
were prices for agricultural output.
The better-than-the  record assumptions about productivity growth  and ignoring  of the
deterioration  of producers'  terms of trade result  in  an overestimation  of output.  The
overestimation  of  livestock  production  in  turn  results  in  overestimation  of  grain
consumption.  The studies also overestimate demand for agricultural  goods because
their assumptions about changes in real consumer income are more optimistic than the
record to date.  From  1991  to  1996, the calculated  average per capita  real  wage  in
Russia (as measured  by the relationship between the nominal average wage and an
index of consumer prices) has fallen 62 percent, with similarly large decreases in other
NIS  countries.  As  a result of the  decline  in consumers'  real  wages, demand  (and
therefore  consumption) for food with high  income elasticity, such as meat and  other
livestock products,  has  dropped  substantially.  However,  Liefert  et  al.  assumes no
reform-induced  change in real income for the NIS region, Koopman  assumes a drop of
only 20 percent, and Tyers declines of 20-30 percent for most of the NIS countries (from
1990  to 2000). The main  reason Liefert et  al.  overestimate  meat imports  (3.6 million
tons  compared  to  an  actual  2.2  million  in  1996)  is  that  by  ignoring  any  decrease  in
consumer income, the study overestimates  meat demand.
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The modeling  framework we  use to forecast  changes  in  NIS. agricultural  production,
consumption,  and trade from the present to 2005 is the Country-Link  System,  a multi-
region and multi-commodity  system  of country and regional models developed  by the
Commercial Agriculture Division of the Economic Research  Service (ERS),  USDA.  The
country-link  system  consists  of  46  country  and  regional  models,  covering  25
commodities,  a U.S.  agricultural sector model (FAPSIM), based  in  Fortran, and ,,linker,"
software and systems that convert all models to Fortran for simultaneous  solution and
generation of output.  Country/regional  models are spreadsheet-based, many  in  Lotus
1-2-3,  some  in  Supercalc.  About  half  of  the  country  models  utilize  the  Country
Projections and Policy Analysis (CPPA)  model-builder designed  at ERS  (Hjort and van
Peteghem  (1991)).  The forecasts presented are for the NIS region  in  the aggregate,
though they are  generated using three separate CPPA models--for  Russia,  Ukraine,
and the  13  remaining  NIS  countries collectively.  The results  from  the  3  models  are
aggregated to obtain NIS totals.
Each country or regional model within the link system is a dynamic partial equilibrium
model  which projects agricultural production,  consumption,  and trade each  year from
MY (marketing year)  1997/98 through  MY 2010/2011  for crops and from  CY (calendar
year)  1998 through CY 2011  for livestock products.  Models are structured as series of
equations for supply and demand  of the  various crops  and  livestock products.  The
residual between supply and demand is net trade.  Crop production  is forecasted  using
area and yield functions.  Each  crop area function depends on current crop prices for
each  of the  10  crops,  while  yield  functions  depend  on  lagged  own  prices  and  an
exogenous productivity trend.  Livestock products usually have  production functions,
which depend on  meat prices and exogenous productivity trends.
Macroeconomic performance,  country policies, and supply and demand elasticities are
exogenous for the model forecasts.  Commodity prices are determined  endogenously
through an iterative process in which global supply and demand  balance is attained for
each commodity for each year of the projection  period.
Forecasting changes in the NIS commodity structure from  the present to 2005 is less
ambitious than forecasting changes that began at the start of reform  in  1992, because
the economy  has  now attained a more  stationary  state than  previously.  As  table 6
shows,  reform  has already greatly restructured agricultural  production, consumption,
and trade  in the NIS  region.  The main  reason for the restructuring  has been  major
reform-induced changes in relative prices (of both inputs and output) and consumer real
incomes.  The policy changes responsible for altering prices and incomes have been
price liberalization, combined with economy-wide reduction or elimination of subsidies
to both producers and consumers, and movement toward the integration of the domestic
economy into the world economy.  Price liberalization fundamentally changed prices by
having them move to better reflect real costs of production, while integration into the
world economy (with only modest trade controls) resulted in prices moving toward world
market levels.
Given  that  the  studies  previously  examined  all  use  partial  equilibrium  models,  any
attempt  to  account for  changes  in  such  variables  as  terms  of trade  and  consumer
income could only be done through bold assumptions.  What made such assumptions
215particularly difficult was the tremendous  inflation the  NIS countries experienced  during
the early reform years (typically over 1,000 percent).
In  most  NIS  countries  price  and trade liberalization  began  sufficiently  long  ago (the
early 1990s)  that the major adjustments  in prices and  incomes have  had enough  time
to  play  out and  are  now  ending.  A general  indicator  that  relative  prices  and  real
incomes  are  beginning  to  stabilize  is  that  inflation  in  the  NIS  countries  has  fallen
substantially. *In  1996 in most countries of the region  it was below 50 percent, with even
better performance  predicted for 1997.  Low  inflation  means that nominal  prices and
incomes cannot change by large enough magnitudes to significantly  alter relative prices
and  incomes.  More specifically, the deterioration  in agricultural  producers'  terms of
trade  has  stopped,  and,  at  least for  some  producers,  the  terms  will  probably  soon
improve.  Also,  average real consumer incomes  in Russia and  most other NIS  nations
have  generally  stopped falling,  and  in  some  countries  are  rising  modestly.  Stable
relative prices and real incomes will mean  less change  in production, consumption,  and
trade of agricultural commodities.
As with the earlier studies,  our forecasts depend heavily on assumptions we must make
for certain reform-sensitive variables.  Our first major assumption  is that there are no
changes in trade policy, which means that the existing moderate controls on agricultural
trade in most NIS countries continue (for example  in Russia, no quantitative restrictions,
and import tariffs ranging from  5 to 30 percent).  The second assumption,  supported  by
recent evidence, is that the terms of trade of agricultural  producers in the NIS  region do
not continue to worsen,  but rather are fixed over the projection  period.
The next assumption  is that real GDP grows modestly over the projection  period.  For
1997,  we  assume  real  GDP  falls 2  percent  in Russia  and  Ukraine,  and  grows  0.6
percent in the rest of the region.  We then assume that growth  begins  in  Russia and
Ukraine  in the late 1990s  (while growth in the rest of the region  is a bit higher),  and that
during 2000-05 the countries of the region grow annually at about 3-3.5 percent.  Our
assumed growth rates are lower than in the faster reforming  countries of Central Europe
(Poland,  Hungary, and the Czech Republic) in recent years.  This reflects our belief that
the  NIS  countries will  continue  to  pursue  less  ambitious  reform  programs  than  the
countries just mentioned,  resulting  in lower economy-wide productivity growth.
The  most  important  set  of variables for which  assumptions must  be made  concerns
productivity  growth  in  agriculture.  We  assume  that  rather  than  continue  to  fall,
agricultural  productivity will rise over the projection  period, though only modestly.  The
main  reason we are not more optimistic is we believe that only slight progress will be
made in the institutional reforms within NIS agriculture necessary to improve incentives
to use resources more productively.
In most  NIS  countries,  including  Russia,  Ukraine,  and  Kazakstan,  the  state  and
collective  farm  system  inherited  from  the  Soviet  period  continues  to  dominate
agricultural  production.  Although output on  private  plots held by farm  workers  has
generally grown, private farming has not taken off, in most countries accounting for less
than 5 percent of arable land and total agricultural output.  (The Caucasus countries of
Georgia and Armenia and the Baltic states are exceptions.)  In the early  reform years,
most former state and collective farms were  officially reregistered as corporatized joint-
stock companies.  However, these  large  corporate farms  have yet to be  restructured
216into viable, profitable businesses.  Three quarters of them were  unprofitable  in  1996,
up from two-thirds the year before,  and  59 percent in 1994.
The former state and collective farms face two serious conundra  that prevent them from
improving the efficiency with which they operate:  the lack of land markets and the  lack
of ownership reform.  The absence of land markets has hurt NIS  agriculture  in  3 ways,
affecting not only productivity performance but also the functioning  of capital markets.
First,  without  land  markets,  land  is  a  (nearly)  free  good  for  managers.  Thus,  it is
overused in farming,  as cultivation  is extended to low-yielding  marginal  land.  Second,
without land  markets,  land, which should be farms' primary asset, cannot function  as
collateral for loans to fund capital investment.  Third, land  is not only virtually free for
farms, but also inalienable.  Since farms do not risk losing their land, regardless of how
unprofitable they might be, management  can pursue objectives other than productivity-
raising cost minimization  or profit  maximization (such as rent seeking or maintaining
worker employment).
The structure of farm ownership also prevents the restructuring  necessary for systemic
improvements in productivity.  The assets of the corporate farms belong collectively to
their shareholders,  composed of farm  workers,  retired employees  and  management.
Decision rights on what crops to grow, hiring and firing, to whom to sell and from whom
to  buy  are  held  by the  shareholders  and  local  political  authorities.  The  provincial
governor,  the  head  of the  provincial  department  of agriculture,  and  other  political
authorities have considerable capacity to influence farm decision-making  through their
control over local taxes, subsidies,  inter-provincial trade permits,  and their analogous
influence with upstream  and downstream suppliers and buyers.
The politicization of ownership rights on corporate farms has resulted  in  higher levels
of farm  employment than would be tolerated if farms were truly cost minimizers.6  This
labor retention can  be  seen  in the continued  losses of (and  subsidies for)  livestock
production, when  livestock prices  are  relatively stable.  Though  widely  unprofitable,
livestock production does not fall to an economically justifiable level on corporate farms,
mainly because it is particularly labor-intensive.  In contrast, crop production  in Russia
is generally profitable.
A similar situation  exists for downstream  livestock and  crop processors, which  were
corporatized, along with other industrial enterprises  in the NIS region, starting  in  1992.
However, by Russian and  Ukrainian law, corporate farms hold 51  percent of the shares
of downstream  processors.  Moreover,  most processors  were built  on a  much  larger
scale than can be accommodated  by the current state of demand, and thus operate with
quite high unit costs of production, such that many are chronic loss-makers.  But local
packing plants, feed mills,  seed crushing facilities and sugar mills  are  seldom  shut
down,  because  of local authorities'  concerns for provincial food self-sufficiency and
employment.
The lack of land reform and ownership reform  not only prevent the restructuring that is
needed to make farms  profitable; the failure to restructure  or allow liquidation of farms
6 Blanchard  and  Aghion  (1996);  Boycko,  Shleifer,  and  Vishny  (1995),  chs.  2-3;  Boycko,  Shleifer,
and Vishny  (1996).
217and processors that are obviously inviable in a market economy  calls into  question the
very  enforceability of contracts with  these enterprises.  In  the end,  the  lack  of  land
markets  and the ownership quagmire of NIS corporate farms  and processors exclude
them from the three avenues for accumulation of capital for investment purposes:  own
profits, joint ventures and bank loans.  We believe that the general  lack of capital under
such conditions will prevent farms and processors from the investment needed for long
term  productivity improvements.
Despite  our  nonoptimistic  views  concerning  NIS  productivity  growth  during  the
projection  period,  we  nonetheless  assume  some  growth  will  occur  (table  7).  The
aggregate grain yield (for all countries and all types of grain)  is projected  to increase
from  1997 to 2005 by  12 percent.  This figure results from an assumed average annual
growth  rate  for wheat  yield of  about  2  percent  (slight  variations  depending  on  the
specific country),  and  average  annual  growth  of yield for  coarse  grains  of  about  1
percent.  Concerning  productivity  in  the  livestock sector, the  grain/meat  conversion
coefficient aggregated across countries and  meats is projected  to fall  from 1997 to 2005
by 16 percent.  This results from  the assumption that in 2005, the grain/meat conversion
coefficient is 10 percent higher (worse)  than in 1990, an improvement over 1996 when
the  coefficient  was  31  percent  higher  (worse)  than  in  1990.  (This  assumption  is
specifically made for Russia; for Ukraine, performance  lags that in Russia by one year;
for the other NIS countries,  performance  lags Russia by two years.)
Agriculture  in  the NIS  region  has  suffered  from  a chronically high  degree  of waste,
during  not only primary production,  but even more so during the downstream  activities
of  storage,  transportation,  and  processing.  The transportation  and  processing  of
foodstuffs was arguably the weakest part of the entire Soviet economy, such that total
waste  for  certain  agricultural  commodities  was  reported  to  exceed  20  percent  of
production.7  Some  observers of NIS agriculture argue that  if reform  simply  reduced
waste,  the NIS  region could become  a major exporter of grain  and  other agricultural
products  (see,  for  example,  Johnson  (1997)).  The  forecasting  studies  previously
examined  in this paper could be said to capture this effect in their assumptions about
improvements  in productivity by defining their supply functions to represent downstream
output rather than just primary production.
In our model,  we formally account for waste,  assuming that over the projection period
it equals 6.5 percent of product, from the farm to the processor.  (We account for waste
during primary production  by using cleanweight harvest figures.)  The reasons we do
not assume better performance are generally the same as to why we do  not assume
higher  productivity  growth  for  primary  agriculture:  poor  incentives  to  improve
performance and poor prospects for investment.
Table 8 presents our predictions for changes in aggregate NIS agricultural production,
consumption,  and  trade to  2005.  The  base  year from  which  the  model  generates
forecasts is calendar year 1998 for meats, and marketing year 1997/98 (July to June)
for grains.  The figures given for calendar years 1997 and 1998 and marketing years
1996/97  and  97/98  are  therefore  our  estimates  (not  generated  by  the  model)  for
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See  OECD  (1991),  pp.  165-66.production, consumption,  and trade.  Figure 1 presents our annual forecasts of the  net
trade balance for total meat, wheat,  and coarse grains.  The  values through  1996 are
the actual historical figures.
Production  and  consumption  of  both meat  and grains  increase  moderately  over  the
projection period,  reflecting the modest  assumptions concerning  growth  of agricultural
productivity  and  consumer  income.  Production  of  meat  grows  a  bit  more  than
consumption,  such that net meat  imports  fall by  9  percent, though  still  remaining  by
2005 close to 2 million tons.  However, imports of poultry, which have fueled the general
rise in meat  imports,  are projected to increase 15 percent.  Grain  imports, on the other
hand, are projected to fall, such that by 2005 the region's aggregate  trade balance  in
grain  is almost zero.  The  results indicate that continued imports  of wheat  are  more
likely than of coarse  grains,  as  the region  could become a  small  net exporter  of  the
latter.
The projections strongly indicate that the major changes in the agricultural trade of the
NIS  region  since reform  will not  be reversed  (assuming  no fundamental  changes  in
trade policy).  The region will continue to be a major importer of meat,  with net imports
in 2005 projected to be about double that in  1991,  as the region's apparent comparative
disadvantage  in meat production continues.  The region will also not return to the large
grain imports of the Soviet period.  Whether a net grain  importer or exporter, the trade
balance either way should not be substantial.
Table  9  compares  pre-reform  NIS  production,  consumption,  and  trade with  our 2005
projections.  Tables  8  and  9  together  illustrate  the  strong  J-curve  effect  (decline
followed  by upswing)  that reform  appears to have on production  and consumption  of
agricultural goods.  Although we project a rebound in both  production and consumption
of commodities, for each product projected production and consumption  in 2005  is  lower
than the pre-reform  level, in most cases substantially so.  This demonstrates the extent
to which the agricultural sector artificially expanded during the Soviet period to levels
of production and consumption that cannot be maintained  in  a market economy where
consumer preferences and relatively free trade, rather than planners' desires, determine
what goods are produced.
Conclusion
Western  studies  done  in  the early  1990s  generally  predict that  large-scale  market-
oriented reform in the NIS region would change it from being a major importer of grain
to  a major exporter.  The studies differ more  in their forecasts for the region's  meat
imports,  some  predicting  an  increase  and  some  a decrease.  Although  the  reform
changes to date have substantially reduced NIS grain imports, they have not turned the
region into an exporter.  Also, since 1991  meat imports have roughly doubled, to over
2 million tons in  1996.
Reform to date has substantially reduced NIS production and consumption of both grain
and  meat,  drops  much  greater  than  these  studies  (based  on  their  assumptions)
forecast.  On  the  demand  side,  the studies  assume  either  too  low,  or  no,  decline  in
consumer  income,  while  on  the  supply  side  they  assume  either  positive,  or  no,
productivity growth. Yet, NIS agricultural productivity from  1991  to 1996 generally fell.
219One must keep in mind, though, that these studies' forecasts are based  on the general
premise,  supported  by specific assumptions,  that  a  larger-scale  reform  program  is
implemented than  most of the NIS countries have yet enacted.
This  paper's forecasts  of changes  in  NIS  agricultural  production,  consumption,  and
trade from the present to 2005 rest on the assumptions that both  real  GDP (reflecting
economy-wide  productivity  growth)  and  productivity growth  in  agriculture  within  the
region will grow modestly over the projection period.  We forecast that in the aggregate
the NIS region  by 2005 will run close to a zero trade balance  in grain,  though  it could
be a  small exporter of coarse grains.  However,  meat imports  are forecast to  remain
substantial, falling a bit to about 1.8 million tons.  Rather than  importing feed to  maintain
an artificially large livestock sector as it did during the Soviet period, the region,  based
on apparent comparative (dis)advantage, should continue to import livestock products
directly.
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i  iO0O  N  C  c (so)s  Iod  C9Table 1--Estimates  of producer subsidy and consumer subsidy equivalents
for the  USSR
Study  Liefert et al. (1993)  Koopman  (1991)  Tyers (1994)
Year  1986  1986  1989  1989  1990





















































Note: All figures are percentages.
na means  not available.
1 Total  subsidies divided by producer revenue.
2 Total subsidies divided by consumer expenditure.
3  Calculated from information  in Tyers (1994).
4  Ruminant  meat.
6  Non-ruminant meat.
6  Covers all commodities for which support was estimated,  not just those reported  in
the table.
Sources:  Liefert et al.  (1993);  Koopman  (1991);  Tyers (1994).C
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HTable 7--History and assumptions  of ERS  projections
Income and  productivity  Cumulative  growth
MY87-91  MY97/98  MY87-91
MY87-91  MY97/98  MYO/06  to  to  to



















































































































































































Note:  Parentheses denote  negative percent change.
All total  values in the table weighted  by GDP or production in respective years.
Sources:  ERS,  USDA;  Goskomstat Rossii, Raskhod kormov  (1996).
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